This paper explores, both formally and empirically, the political accountability mechanisms that lie behind the varying levels of public corruption and of effective governance taking place across nations. The first section develops a principal-agent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions.
Introduction
Although the number of democratic regimes, and thus the use of proper constitutional mechanisms to make politicians accountable to citizens, have expanded substantially in the last decades, corruption among public officials and, more generally, malfunctioning governments remain widespread phenomena across the globe. Unfortunately, this failure to create good governing institutions has dramatic economic and political consequences. On the one hand, growth and, in broader terms, the welfare of citizens have been shown to be enhanced by wellfunctioning governments, that is, governments that abide by the rule of law, whose bureaucrats and policymakers are not affected by graft practices, and whose administrative machinery delivers goods and services in an efficient manner (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 1999a; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995) . On the other hand, for those regimes with elected governments, the presence of political corruption and administrative inefficiency point to a fundamental break in the basis of what should be formally considered representative democracies.
In contrast to the mounting scholarly research on the consequences of good governance, our knowledge about what causes governments to be clean and efficient is still in its infancy.
The current literature has alternatively embraced pre-existing economic conditions, broad cultural patterns, the existence of a particular cooperative milieu among social agents and certain constitutional frameworks as the causes that lie behind good governance. For those researchers who stress the role of the economy, well-performing public institutions are the result of having enough physical and human assets to enable policy-makers to fund and manage in an effective manner comprehensive policies and modern administrative agencies. Cultural theorists emphasize instead the set of normative bonds in which political action is embedded. Effective and uncorrupted governments only arise whenever public civicness or certain ethical beliefs constitute a dominant value in the political community. More recently, good governance has been related to the existence of social capital, that is, the presence of institutionalized norms of reciprocity and trust, enough to empower citizens to overcome potential collective action problems. Finally, and in direct correspondence with the Federalist debates of two centuries ago, for the neoinstitutionalist strand of political science good constitutional engineering should eventually generate the conditions for effective governance. Matching this oversupply of theoretical models, the current empirical work is still inconclusive.
1 More importantly, the prevailing theories of political corruption and governmental performance have hardly fleshed out the micro-mechanisms through which policy-makers comply or, more exactly, are made to comply with the law and behave in a benevolent fashion.
Accordingly, to account for varying levels of public corruption and of effective governmental governance across nations, this paper develops, in its first section, a principalagent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions. In a world in which the actions of a policymaker (as well their consequences) are only partly observable to citizens, the former can be shown to have strong incentives to appropriate parts of the latter's income. Rent-seeking behavior, however, is conditional on the information citizens have over both the state of the world and the policy-maker's decisions. As information goes up, political accountability rises, and the space left for the appropriation of rents declines. The following two sections of the paper test the model. In Section 2 we show that both the presence of democratic mechanisms of control and an increasingly informed electorate, measured through the frequency of newspaper readership, explain considerably well the distribution of corrupt practices and governmental ineffectiveness across a world sample. In Section 3 we extend these results to the universe of U.S. states. Section 4 concludes.
A Theory of Political Accountability
To develop a theory of the causes of political corruption (and, more generally, of good governance), we explore the institutional and informational conditions under which the public can induce policymakers and bureaucrats to behave well.
Following the most recent literature on the sources of political accountability, we can conceive of the machinery of government as a game in which a principal, the public, delegates on an agent, the policy-maker, a given set of instruments to execute certain goals (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999) . This delegation process is not exempted, however, from considerable political tensions due to the existence of both heterogeneous interests and informational asymmetries between the principal and the agent. First, policymakers and voters may have 1 Most studies on corruption are focused on case studies. Exceptions to this trend are Treisman (1998) and La Porta et al. (1998) , who use a worldwide sample. Putnam (1993) explores the broader issue of governance for the universe interests at odds with each other: the former may be simply interested in enriching themselves while in office; or, even if they are honest, their ideas about what enhances the welfare of the public may differ from what the public itself wants. Second, the principal and agents may differ in their corresponding levels of information about the state of the world, the policies to be pursued and their welfare consequences. If the public is less well informed than the policymaker, the latter can more easily impose her preferences or even exploit the public. In short, the delegation of decision-making and policy implementation responsibilities, a "must" in modern representative democracies, automatically opens up the possibility for significant inefficiencies and corruption among political practitioners.
As shown in the seminal papers of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , the solution to the delegation problem lies in the public setting up a control mechanism, such as regular elections, to discipline the policy-maker. If electors vote retrospectively, that is, if they look backwards to the results provided by the incumbent before casting their ballot, elections should make policymakers accountable to the public. Being dependent on electors' support, politicians would strive to deliver good services and refrain from extracting rents. Yet that solution may be only partial. As we show formally below, the effectiveness of any control mechanism depends both on the instruments that the public has to collect information on the behavior of the government and on the ease with which the control device can be exercised.
To model the relationship between policymakers and citizens and to explore the mechanisms through which political accountability and good government take place, we use a principal-agent model developed in Persson and Tabellini (2000) . We extend it to allow for variation in both the extent of information citizens have and on the type of political regime (democratic or authoritarian) in place.
Agents and budget constraint. In the model we consider the incumbent politician's single-period payoff as:
where r are the rents she is able to extract in the period, reduced by the transaction costs of appropriating them (0<? <1), and P are the perks she gets from being in the government, such as recognition, nice cars, good restaurants and so on.
of Italian regions. These studies also include systematic reviews of the existing theoretical literature.
Income does not vary among individuals. Moreover, government spending cannot be targeted to any specific group. As a result, there are N voters with identical preferences, that is, with the following utility function:
where c denotes consumption, y income, t taxes, g a public good and H(.) is a concave and increasing function.
In that setting, the government budget constraint is given by:
where ?e [? L , ? H ] is a random variable, with a well defined density s(.) and distribution S (.) functions, that denotes the cost of producing public goods.
Complete information. In the absence of information or moral hazard problems, rents should be zero, r=0, and the public goods provision by a benevolent dictator should follow the Samuelson criteria:
As a result, the optimal g would be defined by an decreasing function G(? ), and the optimal tax would be set at t =T(? )=? G(?)/N. This policy will be unanimously endorsed by the citizens.
Incomplete or no information. A more plausible scenario, however, is one in which the principal, that is, citizens, cannot fully observe either the state of the world or the actions (and their consequences) of policymakers. To understand how citizens may discipline the policymaker, consider the following game.
First, the state of the economy ? is realized. Whereas the policy-maker fully observes it, the degree of information that voters have may be incomplete. In the most extreme case, that is, in a situation in which voters have no information about the state of the economy and/or life in the presidential palace, they can only use the unconditional distribution of ? to make their inferences, that is, S(.), to vote. More plausibly, over time voters obtain some information, through news media, personal networks or their own direct experiences, about the realization of ?, which they will use to update their beliefs about the distribution of ? in that particular period.
As voters gather more relevant information, they obtain a conditional distribution of the Conversely, whenever that standard is not attained, citizens shift to the opposition candidate. In short, citizens simply behave using a retrospective voting rule, in which ex-ante all politicians are considered to have similar preferences and abilities. Formally, their support rule will be:
where p I is the probability of supporting the incumbent.
Citizens only re-extend their support to the incumbent if the utility level they derive from public policy in state ? exceeds a certain cutoff point Û V . Now, how strict that evaluation yardstick will be varies with the beliefs that citizens have about the state of the world and about the efficacy of the instruments at the hands of the policy-maker. Notice that standard models of political accountability always assume a competitive democratic system in which voters hold policymakers accountable through elections. Here, however, we cast our net wider: we substitute citizens and support for voters and ballots. The goal is to extend the idea of political accountability through the more generic concept of support to examine how political control (and good government) fare under both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Even the most cruel dictatorships require some level of support (at least among sympathizers) to sustain themselves over time. With support related to some minimal performance, whenever that performance is not met, the regime should fall. Naturally, the higher cost of overthrowing a dictatorship (compared with kicking out the incumbent through elections) reduces the relative price of the goods the regime should deliver to avoid a revolution. As a result, mismanagement and corruption should be much higher under authoritarian regimes than democracies, other things being equal. an increase in the regular use of democratic procedures to elect public officials. Overthrowing an incumbent through a revolution or mass protests rather than through regularly contested elections is much more costly to citizens, due to the risks associated with the violence, the problems of coordinating high numbers of protesters, etc. In other words, in authoritarian regimes, where the price of making politicians accountable is much higher, politicians would be more likely to maximize short-term rents. Corruption and mismanagement should be much higher in dictatorships. 4 Second, d varies with the economic structure in place for two reasons: it decreases as the specificity of assets (that generate y) falls; and it also falls as the economic resources become more diversified. As assets become less specific, that is, as the cost of putting them to alternative uses declines, their owners can more easily escape the brunt of self-interested policy-makers. Anticipating the exit option of asset owners, which makes the possibility of appropriating income more difficult to politicians, policymakers will be more inclined to follow 2 Alternatively, we may consider that the ability to confiscate only extends to that amount of revenue that the voters may consider ex-ante reasonable for any potential realization of the state of nature, given their information. This will of course reduce the size of rents. 3 In an a complete intertemporal model, O I and O O would be determined by the model (see Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997) . For simplicity of the exposition here, we consider them as given. 4 Another way to reduce d may consist of designing constitutional structures that increase the costs of appropriating income. This would the case of a separation-of-powers system or a federal structure: with several politicians in charge, the ability of just one of them appropriating the whole national income diminishes substantially. the first political strategy, which consists on providing the level of public goods expected by citizens. Similarly, as the economy becomes more diversified, that is, as it moves from producing only one product, say oil, to having many economic sectors, the cost of appropriating rents by the state is likely to increase. In short, as asset specificity and economic concentration decline, governmental performance should improve.
Voters may always have to cope with a minimum amount of rents (for any state of nature) depending on the parameters of the model. Minimum rents will be determined by comparing the discounted stream of gains from being reelected to those that result from losing power:
Defining O =( ß O I -ßO O ), the policy-maker's minimal rents will be given by:
As the public recognition of the job goes up (and the satisfaction this brings to the politician increases, that is, P increases), O and O I go up and the minimum rents decrease.
Similarly, as d declines, due to more democratic mechanisms, more mobile assets or a more diversified economy, minimum rents also decline.
Using both the government constraint (3) to substitute for t and expression (8) to substitute for y, we can rewrite the voter's utility as:
where r X is any additional rent beyond the minimum that the politician can seize.
5
We know that because voters cannot observe the true state of nature, they choose a reservation utility Û V using the information they have on the distribution of ?, that is, the cost of producing public goods. The higher Û V , the more likely the politician will act myopically. Note that each level of reservation utility Û V implies a threshold value ? * . If the real cost of producing public goods is above this threshold value, that is, if ? > ? * , the politician will choose to seize the maximum amount of income possible, setting t = dy and obtaining r = dNy. She immediately sees that since she cannot satisfy the expectations of voters, she will be defeated in the election.
Conversely, if the real costs of production are below the voter's threshold, that is, ? < ? * , the 5 We assume that after giving up r*, there is still enough revenue in every state, that is,
θ Ω politician will just satisfy the re-election constraint. The politician will set g equal to G(? *) and will collect the minimum rent r * plus an additional rent, r x = G(? *) (? * -? ), due to the cost difference of providing the public good under the realized state and under * .
Using the last expression, we can rewrite the voter's utility level as follows:
Voters will choose the best reservation utility Û V given their information about the distribution of the state of nature S ( ?). The expected utility is given by:
where ? = ? L and θ ≤ ?H are the bounds of the function s(.). As a result the optimal threshold value ? * is given by:
In each period, voters expect a certain rent to be seized, on average, by the politician:
This can be rewritten as:
where From (14) it is easy to see that the expected size of rents for the policy-maker declines as voters gather better information. With increasing levels of information, the probability that voters undervalue the costs of generating public goods will decline. This in turn will depress the policymakers' incentives to appropriate rents than exceed the minimal ones.
In the limit, as the variance of the distribution of ? the voters use shrinks toward zero, (? *-? µ )? 0 and S(? *) ? 1. As a result, the expected rents move down towards the minimum r * ,
that is, E(r) = dNy -O / ? 6 With voters having perfect information about the state of nature in the period, they would still set Û V at the optimal level implied by that particular realization, once minimum rents for politicians had been taken into account. Whenever d=0, either because certain very transparent democratic mechanisms are imposed or because assets are completely mobile, no rents will be appropriated at all-that case would be identical to having a benevolent dictator (that is, a policymaker unconcerned with rents or perks).
Governance and Corruption in the World
To explore the impact of democracy and informational mechanisms on political accountability across nations, we use two types of indicators in this section. In its first part, we employ the recent indices of quality of government developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a and 1999b) for a cross-section of nations in the mid-1990s. We then extend our analysis to a time-series cross-sectional analysis of corruption and other governance indicators that are available since the early 1980s.
Political Governance in the Late 1990s
Dependent variable. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a and 1999b) have recently provided new comprehensive indicators of the quality of government for a cross-section of between 155 and 173 countries for 1997-98. In these studies the quality of governance is measured along three dimensions: "(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Kaufmann et al., 1999a: 1) .
To measure these dimensions, the authors employ data drawn from both polls of experts To measure government quality we have used the aggregate indicators for Graft, the Rule of Law, Regulatory Burden, and Government Effectiveness, as well as an Overall Indicator of Government Quality which is estimated from these four indicators using the principal components method. The index of overall quality has a mean of about 0, varies from a minimum of -4.6 to a maximum of 4.5, and has a standard deviation of 1.86. The separate indexes have a mean around 0 and a standard deviation of 0.9 and generally vary from -1.5 to 2.
Model and independent variables. To estimate the causes of variation in government effectiveness, we estimate the following OLS regression model in a cross-section of nations:
Quality of Government t = a+a 1 Democracy t +a 2 Informational Mechanisms t + a 3
Democracy t * Informational Mechanisms t + a 4 Control Variables t + e t.
range for the actual size of the rent still supports the state of partial or complete confiscation. 7 For the estimation procedure, see Kaufmann et al. (1999b) .
The variables employed are:
(1) "Level of Democracy" in 1994, taken from the Polity III database developed by Jaggers and Gurr (1995) , and rescaled as a variable from 0 to 1. 8 If our discussion on the mechanisms that create political accountability is right, a democratic regime should bolster good governance.
( given the conditions independent of her actions, the incumbent will remain in office in the future.
Accordingly, we should expect that, other things being equal, as political instability increases, the incumbent has a higher incentive to appropriate maximum rents in the present period. In other words, corruption and inefficient policies should rise with instability. (f) Constitutional framework. We consider three types of political institutions: (i) the use or not of a proportional representation electoral system (coded through a dummy variable); (ii) the existence of a federal arrangement (also measured through a dichotomous variable); and (iii) the relationship between the executive and legislative branches through a variable that takes the values of 0 if the president is elected directly, 1 if the president is elected by the assembly but has substantial powers and 2 if the system is purely parliamentarian. The first variable has been built based on Cox (1997) , IDEA (1997), Linz and Valenzuela (1994) , Shugart and Carey (1992) and
Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives). The variable on federalism follows Downes (2000). The latter variable is taken from the Harvard Center for
International Development Political data set. The literature is split on the effects these variables may have on governance. Researchers have alternatively claimed that proportional representation reduces rent-seeking behavior (Rogowski, 1987) and enhances patronage relationships and hinder governmental responsiveness. Similarly, while some see federal systems and separationof-powers systems as disciplining devices that sharpen the extent of potential conflict among to all citizens. In fact, however, given the absence of data on civil liberties, their measure of democracy is built from the subjective coding of the first two elements. politicians and therefore reduce the level of rents (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) , for others a multiplication of veto points simply generates wasteful and inefficient policies. (j) Finally, the presence of "cooperative" practices or arrangements in the population, that is, the level of social capital, which has recently been hailed as a fundamental mechanism to explain good government (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 2000 . Although it is often bundled together with "newspaper readership" and "turnout," we have decided to measure it separately through the level of "interpersonal trust" (as measured in the World Value Surveys). One of the purposes of this paper is to determine through which precise mechanisms do efficient and clean government occur-a question that has not yet been well solved in the literature on social capital (Boix and Posner, 1998) . Newspaper readership is clearly tapping the ability citizens have to control public institutions.
Yet it says nothing about the level of state intervention (through policy regulations) citizens demand from their politicians. The models in Tables 1 through 4 This result is not surprising-the type of behavior captured by this index may be more dependent on societal institutions and practices than on politicians' actions.
10
9 For a first cut on newspaper readership, turnout and quality of government, see IADB (2000) . See also Brunetti and Weder (1999) on the relationship of press consumption and corrupt practices using a cross-section of countries in the early 1990s. 10 The daily circulation of newspapers per person is only partly tapping the degree of monitoring that citizens exercise over public officials. Non-written media, radio and TV, constitute a major and growing source of information for public opinion. As far as we know, however, cross-national studies on TV exposure are not large enough to provide data to check the impact of this mass media on institutional performance. Exposure to political information given in radio and television may have a similar impact as newspaper circulation since, although the impact on political information and action of total time watching TV is still debated, recent studies show that both newspaper readership and time of exposure to TV news are correlated across individuals and increase the political sophistication of voters (Norris, 2000) . Model 3 in all four tables fits particularly well our theoretical expectations. Once we introduce the interactive term "Circulation of Newspapers * Level of Democracy," the level of daily newspaper readership has a negative impact on the quality of government. As the per capita circulation of newspapers increases, governments become less efficient and corruption goes up.
The variable is clearly proxying for the political mobilization that some authoritarian (totalitarian) regimes build through the news media and that, without corresponding political liberties, have a depressing effect on the accountability of policy-makers. Democracy still has a positive impact on governance quality. More importantly, the interactive term shows a very substantial effect on the quality of governments-it is statistically significant either alone (in Tables 3 and 4) or jointly with its components (in Tables 1 and 2 ). conditions inefficiency and corruption attain their maximum levels. In a country with strong readership and no political liberties, corruption is 1.49 points higher than in a democracy with a similar press circulation. In short, it is only the combination of a vibrant and free press that leads to a well-served public.
13
11 The importance of press, democracy and their interaction is not affected by the exclusion of either per capita income or political instability. 12 These simulations are based on Models 3 in Tables 2 and 3 . The values of per capita income and political instability have been set at their means. 13 The effect and statistical significance of press circulation and democracy, alone or in interaction, do not hinge on the inclusion of any control variables. In fact, once we drop per capita income and/or political stability, their coefficients grew both substantively and in statistical significance. Note: The simulation is based on Model 3, Table 3 . Per capita income and political instability have been set at their means.
In Tables 1 through 4 both the level of development and the extent of political stability are statistically and substantively significant in a systematic manner. Economic development is associated with better government. The effect, however, is mild. Setting all other variables at their means, a country with a per capita income of $500 is predicted to have a corruption index of -0.20. For a per capita income of $20,000, the corruption index should be of 0.43. 14 Two comments are in order. First, the causal direction of the relationship is unclear; using the log value of per capita income in 1990 is an attempt to measure the impact that development may have on government performance rather than the other way around. Second, the result does not clarify why, that is, through which channels, does economic development affect governance. At least two mechanisms are conceivable. On the one hand, economic development may just be proxying for the level of physical and human capital available to governments. However, regressing educational variables in the benchmark models of Tables 1 to 4 shows that human 14 When we regress per capita income alone on any index of governmental performance, the size of the coefficient multiplies roughly by three-this is due to a relatively good correlation between press readership and development.
capital is not statistically significant-although it is once we exclude per capita income. 15 On the other hand, economic development can be mostly seen as a shift from highly immobile fixed assets to progressively more mobile capital, that is, from societies that rely on the exploitation of mines and agricultural land to economies based on manufacturing industries and human capitalintensive businesses. In other words, higher levels of per capita income are associated with better governmental performance because, as the proportion of mobile assets increases (due to the process of economic modernization), the capacity of politicians to expropriate resources (the parameter d ) declines.
Political stability has a substantial effect on the quality of government. One standard deviation in the level of political stability (from, say, the United Kingdom to Zambia) reduces the overall quality index by two thirds of a standard deviation of the sample and increases the level of corruption by half a standard deviation of the sample. Tables 5 through 7 introduce, in turn, several control variables to assess the robustness of our results. Table 5 includes controls for the religious composition and legal code of each country (models A1, B1, C1 and D1) as well for the constitutional framework (columns A2, B2, C2 and D2). Table 6 shows controls for economic variables, that is, the size of the state, capital controls and trade openness (columns A1, B1, C1 and D1), and the degree of electoral mobilization (second column of each dependent variable). Table 7 displays controls for social capital (measured through interpersonal trust). In all cases, with the exception of the first column of Table 7 , we employ the unrestricted model with newspaper readership, political regime, their interaction, and controls for economic development and political stability. Notice that the sample declines relative to Tables 1 to 4.   16 15 These results are not shown in the paper. The introduction of educational controls does not erode the impact of newspaper circulation. 16 Ethnic fractionalization has no effect on governmental performance in our unrestricted model. It dampens it, however, when we drop the variable of political instability. Results are not reported in the paper. Both economic development and political stability show very stable coefficients that are statistically significant. Newspaper readership alone continues to depress the quality of government. Except for the index of the rule of law, democratic regimes have a positive effect on governance. Similarly, the interactive term has a strong positive effect on governance. Excluding Table 7 and the first model of Table 6 , the coefficients are very similar to Tables 1 to 4 . We discuss these exceptions later; let us point out here that whenever they differ from the coefficients in Tables 1 to 4 , they turn out to be substantively larger. In all cases, the coefficients are statistically significant, either alone or in a joint test of the interactive terms and their components (and in some cases with per capita income). The need for a joint test derives from the substantial multicollinearity among several regressors.
Religion does not have the theoretical effects generally claimed by the literature (Model 1 in Table 5 ). Protestantism actually depresses the quality of government and it does so slightly more than Catholicism and Islam. It only delivers better results in terms of corruption.
Differences in legal codes, that LaPorta et al. (1998) take to be fundamental in explaining the degree of state intervention and the mechanisms through which individuals protect themselves from corrupt or rent-seeking public servants, turn out to be irrelevant (Table 5 , Model 1). This is not surprising, since LaPorta and his colleagues never specify in what particular ways legal codes should make politicians differ in their behavior. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there is no aspect of Roman law that should make the public sphere more susceptible to corruption than Common law. It is evident that the highly significant coefficient of the "socialist legal code" is just proxying for the rather chaotic transition from planning to market economies that has taken place in former socialist countries. The introduction of a dummy variable for former communist countries makes the "socialist legal code" variable not statistically significant and its coefficient close to zero-this result is not shown here.
Model 2 in Table 5 shows, in turn, that constitutional frameworks do not affect the performance of states. A federal arrangement seems to be associated with slightly worse results, while presidentialism may boost very marginally the quality of government. Yet none of the three institutional variables is statistically significant.
The impact of economic policies is irregular (Table 6 , Model 1). Trade openness is only positively associated with the index of rule of law-yet even in this case the coefficient is small.
In line with the idea that capital liberalization (and hence asset mobility) disciplines states, fewer capital controls come together with higher levels of overall quality of government and efficiency.
Finally, public expenditure only enters significantly in the corruption regression. As the resources of the state increase, graft declines: a larger public sector reduces the incentive public officials have to raise their salaries by illegal means (Table 6 , Model C1).
More interestingly, all the models in the second column of each index in Table 6 show that the level of electoral turnout has a considerable impact on governance. Electoral mobilization alone, independently of the regime in place, depresses the quality of government.
The result goes in line with the effect of newspaper circulation. Without democracy, high levels of turnout and readership simply point to the presence of certain types of authoritarian governments that are rather efficient at controlling and indoctrinating their population. By contrast, as turnout increases in a democratic setting, political accountability goes up substantially. Other things being equal, the index of lack of corruption index rises by about 0.45 points (half a standard deviation in the sample) from a country where only 50 per cent of the population vote to a country where everybody votes. Given the existence of a slight correlation between turnout and newspaper readership (r = .34), the variables measuring newspaper circulation decline a bit. Still, media control of the government continues to affect governments in a notable way. Table 7 turns to examine the impact of social capital, measured as the percentage of people that say people can be trusted, on governmental performance. Notice that, due to the lack of data for a large number of countries, the size of the sample declines to about 50 nations. As noted above, studies on social capital and its consequences on economic and political performance fail to disaggregate, both theoretically and empirically, the micromechanisms that make politicians perform well (Boix and Posner, 1998) . One of the key goals of this paper, by contrast, is to explore the specific channels that create political accountability. Although interpersonal trust and newspaper readership are correlated-the Pearson's coefficient is 0.57-they respond to different dimensions of social and political behavior. Accordingly, Table 7 examines their separate effects through two regressions.
In the first model in Table 7 , we simply report the results of adding the measure of trust to measures of newspaper readership and democracy. Excluding government efficiency, where the interactive term of democracy and press readership turn out to have a negligible effect (but not the separate components of democracy and press circulation), political accountability is still enforced through informational and electoral mechanisms. Model 1 also shows that interpersonal trust is associated with cleaner and more efficient governments. Moving from the lowest level of interpersonal trust (5 percent in Brazil) to the highest level (64 percent in Norway) leads to an increase of 1.7 points in the index of corruption (not far from two standard deviations). What is unclear, however, is the causal direction of the relationship: higher levels of trust may just be the result of better political performance. We will return to this issue in our exploration of the universe of US states.
The second model in Table 7 introduces the controls of political stability and per capita income. Newspaper readership and democracy perform in the predicted direction, although the coefficients of newspaper readership and the interactive term double in size with respect to the results of Tables 1 to 4 . The variable of interpersonal trust now becomes statistically not significant. The strong correlation between interpersonal trust and economic development (with r=0.60) and between trust and political stability (with r=0.70) introduce too much collinearity.
As a result, it is hard to tell whether interpersonal trust directly affects governmental performance or it is just the outcome of two variables, stability and economic resources, that foster both good governance and citizens' well-being. 
Corruption and Bureaucratic Performance Across Countries Since 1980
To date the indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999a Kaufmann et al. ( , 1999b are both the most comprehensive and the closest to passing any internal validity test among the growing number of data that are being generated on corruption and governmental effectiveness. Their drawback, however, lies in that they only refer to a single point in time. A stronger test of our theory requires probing how well it travels over time. We turn to this task in this subsection.
To build a panel of data with cross-sectional and time-series observations, we rely on the set of indicators that the Political Risk Services Group has developed since the early 1980s to assess the political, economic and financial risks in over 110 countries, and that are published in its "International Country Risk Guide." We have employed five types of indexes as our dependent variables: "Corruption," which taps both the demand for bribes from business by political and administrative authorities as well as practices such as patronage, nepotism, job reservation and so on; "Bureaucratic Quality," which measures the institutional strength, expertise, quality and stability of the civil service; "Rule of Law," which includes an evaluation of the strength and stability of the legal system as well as an assessment of the extent of citizens' compliance; "Expropriatory Risk" of property; and "Governmental Repudiation of Contracts."
17 In our sample, interpersonal turst turns out to be strongly conditional on political stability and income inequality. The regression is: TRUST = 52.11 -0.68** GINI COEFFICIENT + 9.85*** POLITICAL INSTABILITY (12.35) (0.31) (3.44) r 2 =0.47 Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05. For a more extend discussion of these results and their implications, see Boix (2000) .
The first three indexes range from 0 to 6. The latter two go from 1 to 10. A higher number indicates a government that is cleaner, more efficient and less threatening to private property.
Our theoretical expectations are that the impact of democracy and information should be strongly positive in reducing corruption and the quality of bureaucracy and then decline as we move into the other variables. Since rule of law measures the stability and legitimacy of the legal system, it should be positively associated with democracy; the effects of newspaper circulation are, however, ambiguous. Finally, our theoretical model does not make any predictions on the risk of expropriation and the possibility that governments may repudiate contracts. Constitutional democracies should dampen the expropriatory threats and time-consistency problems that characterize authoritarian regimes vis-à-vis property owners (Olson, 1993) . But universal suffrage democracies also give the poor the best chance to socialize the means of production.
The impact of newspapers may well be negative: a higher circulation may imply a more mobilized electorate and thus stronger redistributive demands.
Due to our data for newspaper readership, which is only available for 5-year intervals, and to eliminate the year-to-year variability in the data due to mistaken evaluations, we have averaged the data in five-year periods (1982-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-98 ). The dependent variable is then regressed on daily newspaper circulation, democracy, the interaction, and the log of per capita income (market value and constant 1995 dollars). The daily newspaper circulation data corresponds to the initial year of each 5-year period, that is, to 1980, 1985 (in this case an average of the years 1980 and 1990), 1990 and 1995. The democracy index is taken from Polity III, re-scaled to the range 0 to 1, and averaged for the periods 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-93 and 1993-94 (this is the last year of the Gurr dataset). The estimation of the pooled cross-sectional time-series model is done through ordinary least squares, adjusting the standard errors for unequal variation within panels and correcting for autocorrelation.
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18 For a discussion of the appropriateness of this specification, see Beck and Katz (1995) . The models have also been estimated using a random-effects specification, a fixed-effect model to account for potential idiosyncratic effects for different countries, and then change rather than level of the parameters. Results are extremely robust to these different specifications and can be obtained from the authors. Results for corruption are strongly in line with our model. Total explained variance is over 87 per cent in the first model and 97 per cent in the second one. Democracy increases the chances of having a clean government. The daily circulation of newspapers, alone and in interaction with democracy, is positively correlated with the lack of corruption. According to Model A1, the sum of these two variables implies that they explain over one and a half standard deviations in the level of corruption-and close to one in Model A2. Per capita income has a very modest impact on levels of corruption: moving from a per capita income of $500 to one of $20,000 implies 0.8 points in the index of lack of corruption; this is not far from our estimates for the cross-section of countries in subsection 2.1, given the standard deviation of corruption in that sample.
The quality of bureaucracy is also affected by both political regime and the information flow. Democracy has a small impact on the civil service. Newspaper readership fits very well our predictions: newspapers alone depress the quality of government. But, in interaction with democracy, they certainly boost governmental performance. Simulating Model B1 shows that whereas in an authoritarian regime with high media circulation the index of quality of bureaucracy would be 2, in a democratic regime with high media circulation it should climb up to about 4.6, other things being equal.
The import of democracy and media circulation decline substantially for all other measures of performance. Press and democracy affect positively the index of rule of law in Model C1. Their effect disappears, however, once we introduce the lagged value of rule of law.
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Democracy has a dissuasive impact on the temptation policymakers may have to expropriate property owners. But a democratic setting with high levels of newspaper reading seems to pose a potential threat to property, at least if we are to believe the subjective perceptions that form the basis of the surveys of PRS.
As noted above, all these results should not surprise us. They actually reinforce the validity of the political accountability model presented in this paper. A higher level of political accountability translates into cleaner and more effective governments. But it may say nothing about whether citizens will comply with the law. And it certainly does not affect what policies citizens demand and governments pursue toward redistribution and private property. In other words, our model is not getting good empirical results merely because we are looking at different components of a well-functioning political system in which all kinds of "good behavior" cluster tightly together. On the contrary, the impact of political accountability varies across different dimensions of political life. It is fundamental to reduce corruption and increase administrative efficiency. But it does not necessarily color the character of substantive policies. 20 The strength of our estimations resides in that they are able to discriminate among different questions (corruption, performance, degree of state intervention) and models in quite a precise manner.
Corruption in US States
The validity of any theory ultimately hinges on how well it travels across different universes of cases. So far, we have tested our political accountability model on both a cross-section and a panel data of world states. We turn now to explore its implications as well as its robustness on the universe of US states-that is, in not fully sovereign political units. If the model is correct, higher levels of political participation and higher levels of political information and transparency should lead to more disciplined, less corrupt politicians.
To test our theory in the US, we examine the underlying causes of political corruption in the American states. The measure of political corruption is the number of public officials in each state who have been convicted for violating laws against public corruption per one hundred elected officials in that state. To eliminate random variations in yearly data, we employ the total number of convictions for two separate periods, 1977 separate periods, -1987 separate periods, and 1986 separate periods, -1995 by the US Department of Justice's Public Integrity Section, has been collected and reported by Meier and Holbrook (1992) and Schlesinger and Meier (2000) . During the first period of 20 The differences in the explanatory value of democracy and newspaper circulation are the more robust given how relatively well correlated the different PRS indexes are. For example, the lowest Pearson's coefficient of correlation between any of the five indicators is 0.63 (the one between corruption and expropriation of risk Schlesinger and Meier, 2000) .
We examine the causes of variation in corruption in two ways. First, we estimate our model in a cross-section of the average of both periods. Second, we estimate a panel of the two periods using the same procedures discussed above. Results are reported in Table 9 . Both models in Table 9 In line with a fall in political participation and associational life (Putnam, 2000) , it has dropped in recent years to a range from 0.12 to 0.30 (and a mean of 0.21) in 1995.
The level of turnout and per capita income are also taken from the Statistical Abstract of the US.
Data on audit capabilities is given by Meier and Holbrook (1992) . The index of social capital is a summary measure built through factorial techniques using data on interpersonal trust, associational life and political participation (Putnam, 2000) . 21 As a result of this adjustment process, the daily newspaper circulation per person drops from 0.35 to 0.26 in New York and from 0.39 to 0.12 in Virginia (where major papers are printed) while increasing slightly in many other states. The data on New York is only partially adjusted since data on sales by state were not made available to us by the New York Times; this leads to an overestimation of the number of newspapers read in New York. Results do not change, however, even when we exclude this observation.
Total variance in the models in Table 9 is high and the coefficients are very stable. The results show that the number of convictions declines by 3.5 (about one and half standard deviations in the panel data) if we move from the lowest to highest levels of newspaper circulation. Exactly replicating the results obtained in Table 6 above (Model 2), the level of electoral participation has a strong impact on corruption. Turnout in presidential elections varies from 40 to 70 per cent approximately (the mean is around 55 per cent). Accordingly, increasing An introduction of a time variable in the panel data estimation leads to a very small (-0.15) and statistically not significant coefficient. We are tempted to conclude from this last result that the increase in the level of corruption from the first to the second period is neither a randomly determined effect nor a consequence of improved federal resources, but rather that it is directly tied to the decline in both newspaper readership and electoral participation that had taken place over time and that we have shown to be the key mechanisms to exact good behavior from politicians.
The models we report in Table 9 have been subjected to a long battery of controls-the results are not included since coefficients for those variables are not statistically significant.
Controls include resources in the hands of the federal government (measured through federal attorneys per 100 population, federal judges per 100 population and backlogged federal cases), social characteristics of the state population (percent of urban population, college graduates and percent with a high school degree or higher), degree of party competition (measured as the difference between the first and second parties in elections), type of party organization (measured through the index of "traditional party organization" reported by Mayhew, 1986 22 An analysis of the separate impact of each of the components of the index of social capital shows that purely associational measures (such as number of organizations per capita, attendance to club meetings, etc.) do not explain levels of corruption. Corruption declines with both higher levels of interpersonal trust and participation in politics.
In the former variable, the causal direction probably flows from corruption to trust. The latter type of variable, measured through number of people attending local meetings and number serving as officers in organizations, is, as
Erikson and McIver and modified by Meier and Holbrook, 1992 , to include Alaska and Hawaii), campaign reporting requirements (defined as the number of groups or types of individuals required to file campaign finance statements) and size of public budget and state bureaucracy (measured through number of government employees per 1000 inhabitants, mean salary of state employees, ratio of public budget to employees, and public tax revenue per capita). 23 Newspaper circulation and turnout are especially robust to the introduction of these control variables. Per capita income becomes statistically not significant when measures of urban share of the population and educational level are introduced in the regression. In turn, once we drop per capita income, the variables measuring education levels, urban population, and proportion of public employees become significant: the first one reduces corruption; the latter two increase it.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the causes that underlie the wide variation in government performance and corruption we still observe today across the globe. Our explanation is relatively straightforward. How well any government functions simply hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions. The types of tasks modern states have to accomplish force citizens to hand over massive resources and discretionary powers to policymakers. This process of delegation, however, is likely to jeopardize the welfare of citizens.
Politicians may be tempted to exploit the lack of information that voters may have about policies and their consequences either to pursue their own agenda or to appropriate part of the public budget. Thus, it is only when citizens effectively discipline policymakers to serve them that public goods are delivered in an efficient manner and corruption is curtailed.
The political control of public officials turns out to depend on two key factors. First, free and regular elections allow citizens to discipline politicians-the credible threat of losing office in the next period compels policy-makers to respond to the voters' interests. Second, and equally important, the degree of information of citizens curbs the opportunities politicians may have to engage in political corruption and mismanagement. Governmental performance improves as
citizens have more precise knowledge on both the policies adopted by politicians and the environment in which they are implemented, provided that competitive elections are in place to a matter of fact, tapping the political accountability mechanisms we have already uncovered in the course of the paper. punish the incumbent. As shown in the paper, the presence of a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explains between one half and two thirds of the variance in the levels of governmental performance and corruption. This result is robust to the type of indicator, the time frame and the universe we employ. It explains well why corruption is rampant in sub-Saharan Africa and Russia yet close to non-existent in Canada, Central and Northern Europe or New
Zealand. It accounts for the impressive cleanliness of American states in the Plains as well as for the much higher level of federal indictments of public officials in the South of the USA.
A well-informed and politically mobilized electorate matters more than the level of economic development to ensure good government. Per capita income is correlated, although only mildly, with better performance for two reasons. First, the impact of per capita income partly reflects the fact that richer nations have more resources. Second, it proxies for the ways in which the structure of the economy, both in terms of the mobility of factors and the diversity of economic sectors, may constrain politicians. Our results on the positive impact of financial liberalization on performance provide, in fact, some indirect evidence on the disciplining effect that giving more exit options to citizens may have on public officials.
In the last decade, civil society has been resurrected as a main variable to explain the political and economic vibrancy of nations. To some extent, newspaper readership and electoral competitiveness are part and parcel of any "strong" society. But civil society is too broad a concept to have real analytical leverage: one of the goals of the paper has been to delimit more effectively what mechanisms serve to control politicians. The paper shows that strong cooperative patterns and higher levels of interpersonal trust may matter-the evidence is rather mixed for the world sample and close to non-existent for the American states once we control for participation and information levels. But overall it is the presence of politically active and sophisticated electorates that does the job of generating better politicians.
Having the proper mechanisms to enforce political accountability reduces to a marginal role most of the remaining potential variables entertained by the current literature. Neither the structure of the legal system nor any specific religion appears to affect the performance of government. Ethnic conflict has no direct effect on institutional performance-although it may indirectly, since it fosters political instability, which in turn depresses the quality of government.
Variations in the type of constitution-in the electoral system, degree of political centralization 23 Most data have been taken from Meier and Holbrook (1992) and from the Statistical Abstract of the US.
or legislative-executive relations-do not alter the behavior of politicians. This last result should only in part be read as rebuttal of the growing favor that neoinstitutional models are finding among political economists. Our sense is that governmental performance hinges more on the way in which the linkage between voters and politicians is structured or institutionalized than on the constitutional framework in place. As of now, however, we do not have the right type of crossnational indicators to measure the extent to which politicians and voters are connected by clientelistic or any other kind of relationships. This points out the lines of research we should work on in the future. We need to explore what types of linkages connect politicians and voters in different countries and party systems as well as the ways in which they impair or increase government's accountability. Similarly, we should pay more attention to the conditions that generate the kind of mobilized democracies that lead to good government.
